Pakistan’s long-standing struggle with militancy appears to have entered a new phase, with Islamabad increasingly relying on local armed groups, community militias, and informal security networks to manage internal insurgencies. The debate over this shift was recently brought into public focus by Maulana Fazlur Rehman, who questioned the growing emphasis on civilian mobilization against militant groups and warned against transferring the burden of national security to local communities. Rehman stated: “You tell us to raise militias, take up weapons, and fight armed groups ourselves. I have not taken any salary. I will not raise a militia.”
His remarks triggered a strong response from supporters of Pakistan’s security establishment, who argued that local participation is necessary in regions where militant groups exploit difficult terrain, weak governance, and limited state presence. However, the controversy surrounding Fazlur Rehman’s comments reflects a much deeper question confronting Pakistan’s security architecture: Is the state strengthening its security institutions, or is it increasingly transferring responsibility for security to local communities and informal armed actors?
Pakistan’s internal security architecture appears to be evolving from a state-centric model of counterinsurgency towards a hybrid security framework in which formal institutions increasingly rely on informal armed networks to manage persistent internal conflicts. This shift reflects not merely an operational choice but a deeper institutional challenge: the inability of conventional security structures alone to establish durable control in conflict-affected regions. Although local security actors offer advantages through their knowledge of the terrain, intelligence networks, and community ties, their growing role also raises concerns about accountability, command structures, and the erosion of the state’s monopoly over coercive power.
Pakistan’s Internal Security Challenges
Islamabad’s increasing reliance on irregular security actors comes amid a worsening internal security environment. The resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and intensified attacks by Baluch insurgent groups have exposed the limitations of Pakistan’s existing counterinsurgency strategy. Despite extensive military deployments, intelligence operations, and counterterrorism campaigns, Pakistan has been unable to contain these insurgencies.
The shift towards irregular security actors is driven by several factors. Baluchistan and KP are among the most difficult regions to conduct security operations because of their challenging terrain, vast geographical distances, weak administrative presence, and porous borders with Afghanistan and Iran. Another major factor behind Pakistan’s evolving security model is the weakening of civilian security institutions, particularly provincial police forces.
