On June 20, 2025, Sri Lanka deported 85 Chinese nationals convicted of cyber-related offenses, an episode that underscores the country’s deepening entanglement in transnational cybercrime networks. These individuals were part of a larger group of approximately 230 suspects arrested in October 2024 during a massive crackdown on online fraud targeting international banks. Among the evidence collected were more than 200 mobile phones, over 100 laptops, and assorted electronic devices, handed over to a representative from the Chinese Embassy in Colombo as part of legal proceedings. The deportees were transported under heavy security in five buses to Bandaranaike International Airport, then flown to Guangzhou via a chartered SriLankan Airlines flight.
This mass deportation is not an isolated event. Over the past several years, Sri Lankan authorities have consistently uncovered large-scale schemes orchestrated by Chinese nationals, from Panadura to Gampaha and Galle, centered on digital scams and financial fraud. These operatives typically enter the country on tourist visas, establish temporary hubs in rented accommodations, and deploy advanced equipment, routers, laptops, and mobile networks, to execute complex scams. Sri Lanka’s relatively lax regulatory environment, visa leniency, and limited cross-border coordination have made it an attractive staging ground for criminal networks seeking refuge from intensified crackdowns in China.
The October 2024 arrests signaled the scale of the problem, yet the June 2025 deportations represent a worrying trend – enforcement without resolution. While China claims to be a victim of cybercrime, its international reputation as one of the foremost state sponsors of cyber offensive operations, including espionage targeting governments, businesses, and critical infrastructure, casts doubt on such assertions. The Chinese Embassy’s narrative, portraying its nationals in Sri Lanka as victims of manipulation, glosses over the very real damage suffered by Sri Lankan citizens, many of whom lost substantial sums to these illicit schemes.
Justice, in many of these cases, has been truncated. Victims are left without recourse as perpetrators depart under diplomatic protection, escorted swiftly out of the country before full investigations can conclude or restitution is made. The rapid repatriation process further obscures accountability and undermines the principle of local jurisdiction. With Sri Lankan courts convicting, and Chinese officials retrieving both evidence and convicts, the optics, and implications, are deeply unsettling.
Further compounding the issue, China dispatched a special investigation team to Sri Lanka in September 2024, nominally to assist with case management. However, the timing and nature of these legal overtures suggest a different agenda – to exert influence over Sri Lanka’s judicial apparatus, expedite deportations, and reclaim control over narratives involving Chinese nationals. Repeated visits by Chinese legal officials have consistently coincided with mass deportations, creating the impression that China’s priority lies not in justice, but in shielding its citizens from Sri Lanka’s penal consequences.
What emerges is a troubling pattern of extraterritorial assertiveness. China’s influence in Sri Lanka’s law enforcement ecosystem is both expanding and embedding, often under the guise of cooperation. Beijing has rolled out initiatives aimed at shaping domestic enforcement priorities, including Chinese language training for Sri Lankan police personnel, digital and physical infrastructure support, and immersive exchange programs exposing officials to Chinese legal and policing systems.
While such programs may be typical of bilateral collaboration, their cumulative effect in this context suggests a calculated strategy: not just to foster familiarity, but to align institutional priorities with Beijing’s geopolitical interests. This includes softening judicial scrutiny of Chinese nationals, facilitating operational dependencies, and redefining the boundaries of accountability when foreign actors are involved in domestic crimes.
In reality, this influence is not only administrative, it is ideological. Through legal doctrine, operational protocols, and cultural imprints, China appears to be reshaping how law enforcement responds to crimes involving its citizens. The asymmetry is glaring; Sri Lanka enforces the law, yet China determines its reach. The result is a sovereignty dilemma, where a small country’s capacity to protect its citizens and uphold its justice system is tested by the strategic heft of a powerful ally.
For Sri Lanka, the challenge now is to recalibrate. Addressing cybercrime effectively will require more than deportations, it demands fortified legal frameworks, regional cooperation, and above all, a principled stance on judicial independence. It means refusing to let diplomacy dilute due process, and ensuring that local victims are not forgotten amid foreign negotiations.
The stakes extend beyond the courtroom. As China deepens its footprint in law enforcement circles, under the banner of anti-fraud cooperation, it is redefining the contours of control, leaving Sri Lanka, and potentially other small states, caught in a delicate balancing act: defending their laws without alienating the very power that bends them.
